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Abstract In an economy which could not accommodate the full employment
of its labor force, it employs some labor but does not employ others. The bi-
partition of the labor force is random, and we characterize it by an axiom of
equal employment opportunity. We value each employed individual by his or
her marginal contribution to the production function; we also value each un-
employed individual by the potential marginal contribution the person would
make if the market hired the individual. We then use the aggregate individual
value to distribute the net production to the unemployment welfare and the
employment benefits. Using real-time balanced-budget rule as a constraint and
policy stability as an objective, we derive a scientific formula which describes
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a fair, debt-free, and asymptotic risk-free tax rate for any given unemploy-
ment rate and national spending level. The tax rate minimizes the asymptotic
mean, variance, semi-variance, and mean absolute deviation of the underlying
posterior unemployment rate. The allocation rule stimulates employment and
boosts productivity. Under some symmetry assumptions, we even find that
an unemployed person should enjoy equivalent employment benefits, and the
tax rate goes with this welfare equality. The tool employed is the cooperative
game theory in which we assume many players. The players are randomly bi-
partitioned, and the payoff varies with the partition. One could apply the fair
distribution rule and valuation approach to other profit-sharing or cost-sharing
situations with these characteristics. This framework is open to alternative
identification strategies and other forms of equal opportunity axiom.
Keywords Tax Rate · Unemployment Welfare · Equal Opportunity · Fair
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1 INTRODUCTION
The problem with which we are concerned relates to the following typi-
cal situation: consider an economy which could not achieve full employment
of its labor force, and therefore some people are employed, and others are
not. As the employed receives wages and employment benefits (e.g., pension,
health insurance, social security, education allowances, paid vacation), should
the unemployed receive some unemployment welfare? If YES, how much is
fair? In a specific jurisdiction system, the term “unemployment welfare” here
may also mean “unemployment benefits,” “unemployment insurance,” or even
“unemployment compensation.” In an advanced economy, the answer to the
first question is likely YES. This paper answers the second question by justi-
fying a fair share of unemployment welfare for the unemployed and deriving a
fair tax rate for the employed. Fair unemployment welfare and a fair tax rate
are among the most fundamental topics of our society.
The fair-division problem arises in various real-world settings. For a sim-
ple motivating example, let us consider a k-out-of-n redundant system in en-
gineering which has n identical components, any k of which being in good
condition makes the system work properly. When valuing the importance of
each component (either working or standby), one may intuitively claim that
these components should be equally valued. A very similar situation occurs in
a simple majority voting where not all the voters would support the proposal
to vote; thus, the proposal could be passed or failed. Nevertheless, voters are
supposed to have the same voting power no matter what they support and
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for whom they vote. For another example, in the health insurance industry,
not all of the policyholders are ill and use the insurance to cover their medical
expenses. The question is how to fairly share the total medical cost among
both the ill policyholders and the non-ill ones. In a labor market, we have a
similar, but more complicated situation: on the one hand, the market could
not hire all of its labor force even though everyone in the market would like
to be employed; on the other hand, the participants in the market have het-
erogeneous performance in the production. There are four common features
in these examples: a coalition of players with cooperative nature, a random
bipartition of the players, a payoff associated with the partition, and an ob-
jective to share the payoff with all the players. This paper derives a solution
for situations with these features. In the k-out-of-n redundant system and the
simple majority voting, we expect equality of outcome.
We face a few challenges to deal with when fairly distributing the welfare
and benefits, both generated by the employed. First of all, fairness may be an
abstract but vague concept. We believe that “fairness” is bound with the equal-
ity of employment opportunity, not with the equality of outcome, nor with the
equality of productivity. Furthermore, we also believe that everyone in the la-
bor market could contribute in some way; but the opportunities are limited.
Thus, unemployment is not a fault of the unemployed, nor a flaw of the labor
market, but a self-adjustment mechanism toward the efficiency of the market.
Secondly, we attempt to apply a taxation policy to the labor market which op-
erates in an ever-changing economy and with ever-changing productivity. For
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it to be useful, the tax and division rule should be not only fair to all people but
also be able to cope with the uncertainty and sustainability in generating and
distributing the net production. Ideally, it should balance the account of value
generated and that of value paid in each employment contingency. Thirdly, in
a perfect world, a fair tax rate should depend only on observed data, to avoid
any excessively political bargaining and costly strategic voting. One major is-
sue, however, is the non-observability of the heterogeneous-agent production
function in all employment scenarios at all the time. Another data issue is
the desynchronization between the unemployment rate and the tax rate; the
former is high-frequency data while the latter has a lower frequency. Often in
a yearly time-frame, policymakers determine the tax rate after observing most
monthly unemployment rates.
Vast literature (e.g., Kornhauser 1995; Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2006) from
various aspects has studied the fairness in taxation and unemployment pay-
ments. In particular, Shapley (1953) proposes an influential axiom of fairness
to develop a fair-division method, called the Shapley value, which is widely
used in distributing employment compensation and welfare (see, for exam-
ple, Moulin 2004; Devicienti 2010; Giorgi and Guandalini 2018; Krawczyk and
Platkowski 2018). Beneath the pillars of the Shapley value and the Shapley ax-
iom, however, are two underlying assumptions: players’ unanimous participa-
tion in the production, and distributor’s complete information about the pro-
duction function. Recently, Hu (2002, 2006, 2018) relax the unanimity assump-
tion and generalize the Shapley value, using some non-informative probability
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distributions for the dichotomy or bipartition of the players. In particular, Hu
(2018) proposes using a Beta-Binomial distribution to address the equality of
opportunity. This current research also capitalizes on the Beta-Binomial dis-
tributions. Furthermore, we do not assume the complete information about
the production function. We only need its value at one observation which does
occur.
The advantage of our approach is twofold. On the one hand, we provide a
game-theoretical micro-foundation for a fair-division solution to distribute the
unemployment welfare and employment benefits. One can apply the solution
concept to many similar situations without substantive alternations, and one
may also extend the framework using other identification schemes, rather than
the tax policy stability or unemployment rate minimization, detailed in Section
4. On the other hand, the fair tax rate we provide is simple enough to be used
in practice. It relies only on the unemployment rate and a reserved portion
of production, which is not for personal use. The total unemployment welfare
depends only on the tax rate and the observed production. We attempt to
immunize our solution from any unnecessary randomness, hypotheticals, am-
biguity, and latency. These include, but are not limited to, the competitive
and cooperative features of the labor market, endogenous employment search
behavior, non-linear schedule of tax rates, the exact sizes of the labor market
and time-varying unemployment population. With this simplicity in hand, a
certain level of abstraction is necessary and any application of the fair solution
should accommodate to the concrete reality.
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We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 applies the
framework of dichotomous valuation (or simply, “D-value”) in Hu (2002, 2006,
2018) to value each person in the labor market, assuming equal employment
opportunity. The two sides of D-value depend on two unknown parameters
and are aggregated separately for the unemployed and the employed labor.
Next, Section 3 formulates a set of fair divisions of the net production, using
the aggregate components of D-value. In this section, we base the set of fair
tax rates on two accounting identities for a balanced budget. In Section 4, by
maximizing the stability of the tax rate or minimizing the expected posterior
unemployment rate, we identify a specific relation between the fair tax rate
and the unemployment rate. The particular solution is robust under a few
other criteria. Section 5 lists three other applications (namely, voting power,
health insurance, and highway toll) of the distribution rule, and Section 6
suggests several ways to extend this framework. The account is self-contained,
and the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 DICHOTOMOUS VALUATION
Before our formal discussions, let us introduce a few notations. For a general
economy, we assume that its labor force consists of the employed labor and the
unemployed labor, ignoring any part-time labor. Let N = {1,2, · · · ,n} denote
the set of people in the labor force, indexed as 1,2, ...,n, and let S⊆N denote
the random subset of the employed labor in N. For any subset T of N, let |T |
denote its cardinality; for notational simplicity, we often use n for |N|, t for
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|T |, and s for |S|. Let us also write the employment rate as ω= sn , which is one
minus the unemployment rate. Besides, we employ the vinculum (overbar) in
naming a singleton set; for example, “i” is for the singleton set {i}. Also, we
use “\” for set subtraction, “∪” for set union, and β(·, ·) for a two-parameter
Beta function. The Appendix defines ∆, ∆1, · · · ,∆9 as shorthand notations.
2.1 Equality of Employment Opportunity
Equal employment opportunity is widely acknowledged and is the start-
ing point or axiom for us to study fairness and welfare. In the United States,
for example, equal employment opportunity has been enacted to prohibit fed-
eral contractors from discriminating against employees by race, sex, creed,
religion, color, or national origin since President Lyndon Johnson signed Ex-
ecutive Order 11246 in 1965. In the literature1, there are abundant qualitative
descriptions, informal or formal, about the equal opportunity (e.g., Friedman
and Friedman 1990; Roemer 1998; Rawls 1999). In this section, we introduce
a quantitative and probabilistic version of equal opportunity whereby the em-
ployment opportunity is assumed equitable for all persons in the labor force.
We assume three layers of uncertainty for the random subset S while main-
taining the equality of employment opportunity. In the first layer, the employ-
1 Besides the justification from equality of opportunity, unemployment welfare could also
come from other considerations (e.g., Sandmo 1998, Tzannatos and Roddis 1998, Vodopivec
2004). These include, but are not limited to, social protection, insurance of income flow,
poverty prevention, the efficiency of the labor market, and political considerations. In this
paper, we focus solely on equal employment opportunity.
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ment size |S| follows a binomial distribution with parameters (n,p). When
independence is assumed, p is the probability of any given person being em-
ployed. In the second layer, the unknown parameter p has a prior Beta distri-
bution with hyperparameters (θ,ρ), where θ > 0 and ρ> 0 are to be determined
by estimation or specification. Thus, the joint probability density of p ∈ (0,1)
and |S|= s is
pθ−1(1−p)ρ−1
β(θ,ρ)
n
s
ps(1−p)n−s = n!s!(n−s)! pθ+s−1(1−p)ρ+n−s−1β(θ,ρ) . (1)
Eq.(1) implies the following marginal probability density for |S|= s:
P(|S|= s) =
∫ 1
0
n!
s!(n−s)!
pθ+s−1(1−p)ρ+n−s−1
β(θ,ρ) dp
= n!s!(n−s)!
β(θ+s,ρ+n−s)
β(θ,ρ) , s= 0,1, · · · ,n.
(2)
In the third layer, for any given employment size s, all subsets of size s have
the same probability of being S. As there are n!s!(n−s)! subsets of size s in N,
the probability for the employment scenario S= T is
P(S= T ) =

P(|S|=s)
n!
s!(n−s)!
= β(θ+s,ρ+n−s)β(θ,ρ) , if t= s;
0, otherwise.
(3)
Clearly, the equality of employment opportunity is implied in the assumed
triple-layered uncertainty. Furthermore, equal opportunity is also assumed for
all coalitions of the same size.
By Eq.(1) and Eq.(2), the posterior density function of p given |S|= s is
n!
s!(n−s)!
pθ+s−1(1−p)ρ+n−s−1
β(θ,ρ)
n!
s!(n−s)!
β(θ+s,ρ+n−s)
β(θ,ρ)
= p
θ+s−1(1−p)ρ+n−s−1
β(θ+s,ρ+n−s) .
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Thus, the posterior employment rate follows a Beta distribution with param-
eters (θ+s,ρ+n−s). In the following, let us use p˜n,ω to denote the posterior
employment rate given the observance of |S|= nω. In contrast, p is the unob-
servable prior employment rate, and ω is the observable employment rate.
2.2 Value of the Employed and the Unemployed
For any T ⊆ N, we use a heterogeneous-agent production function v(T )
to measure the aggregate productivity when S= T . We assume the net-profit
production function v(T ) excludes the labor cost which compensates the time
and efforts devoted by the employed labor in producing v(T ). To isolate the
added value by the labor force alone, we also assume that v(T ) excludes the
cost of consumed physical and financial resources. Both the labor cost and
the resource cost are exempt from taxation in a firm. Thus, without loss of
generality, we may assume that v(∅) = 0 for the empty set ∅. However, v(T )
does not necessarily increase with T nor with its size |T |. To retain its labor or
to minimize its labor turnover, a firm would share part of its net profit with
its employees. To keep things simple, we use the term “employment benefits”
to denote the employees’ profit-sharing part in v(T ), in contrast to the term
“unemployment welfare.”
Let us formally introduce two components of the D-value. For any i ∈ N,
to analyze its marginal effect on the value generating process, we consider two
jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive events:
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– Event 1 : i ∈ S. Then, i’s marginal effect is v(S)−v(S\ i), called marginal
gain, in that he or she contributes v(S)−v(S\ i) to the production, due to
his or her existence in S. The expected marginal gain is
γi[v]
def= E
[
v(S)−v(S\ i)] . (4)
In the above, “def” is for definition and “E” for expectation under the
probability distribution specified by Eq.(3).
– Event 2 : i 6∈ S. Then, i’s marginal effect is v(S∪ i)−v(S) in that S faces a
marginal loss v(S∪ i)− v(S), due to i’s absence from the employed labor
force S. In other words, the person would increase the production by v(S∪
i)− v(S) if the market included him or her in S. The expected marginal
loss is then
λi[v]
def= E
[
v(S∪ i)−v(S)] . (5)
We let γi[v] be the employment benefits i receives when he or she is em-
ployed, and let λi[v] be the unemployment welfare i receives when he or she
is unemployed. Note that, even if i always remains employed, both S and S\ i
change daily, if not hourly; thus i’s marginal gain is not a constant. Similarly,
even if i remains unemployed for a while, S, S∪ i, and i’s marginal loss are not
constant. To account for this uncertainty, we have already taken expectations
in Eq.(4) and Eq.(5) when defining γi[v] and λi[v].
A few key points worth mentioning to help us understand the profit-sharing
strategy. First, in addition to receiving employment benefits, the employed la-
bor also receives the reimbursement for labor cost, which compensates its
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human capital usage in generating v(S). Human capital also accumulates in
prior employment and pre-employment education. Labor, physical, and finan-
cial costs are not part of the generated value v(S). The unemployed labor,
however, only receives unemployment welfare. Secondly, if i ∈ S, then v(S\ i)
is not observable while we observe v(S). Similarly, when j 6∈ S, we cannot
observe both v(S∪ j) and v(S) simultaneously. Thus, we need to transform
the aggregate marginals into observable forms, such as those in Theorem 1.
Thirdly, the aggregate employment benefits
∑
i∈S
[
v(S)−v(S\ i)] is not neces-
sarily equal to v(S), the value collectively generated by S. Thus, we distribute
some of the surpluses v(S)−∑
i∈S
[
v(S)−v(S\ i)] to the unemployed labor N\S.
The distribution is not through personal giving but government taxation and
unemployment payment systems. This distribution channel also appeals to us
for the aggregate benefits and aggregate welfare at the national level, as stated
in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 The aggregate components of the D-value are
∑
i∈N
γi[v] = E
[∑
i∈S
(
v(S)−v(S\ i))]
= nβ(θ+n,ρ)β(θ,ρ) v(N) +
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N
t(θ+ρ−1)−nθ
ρ+n−t−1
β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T ),∑
i∈N
λi[v] = E
[ ∑
i∈N\S
(
v(S∪ i)−v(S))]
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
t(θ+ρ−1)−n(θ−1)
θ+t−1
β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )− nβ(θ,ρ+n)β(θ,ρ) v(∅).
(6)
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3 ACCOUNTING IDENTITIES FOR A BALANCED BUDGET
By Eq.(3), the expected production is
E [v(S)] =
∑
T⊆N
β(θ+ t,ρ+n− t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T ). (7)
Out of the 2n employment scenarios for S, we observe only one. Let us consider
this particular scenario at S= T , which occurs with probability β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)β(θ,ρ)
and which generates the value v(T ). After the production, we face a challenge
of fairly dividing v(T ) between T and N\T , whom both have an entitlement
to v(T ). Our division rule should fully respect the entitlement claim: each em-
ployed person receives his or her expected marginal gain, and each unemployed
person receives his or her expected marginal loss. As a contrast, the Shapley
value distributes v(N) to all players in N; Hu(2018) formulates solutions to
divide E [v(S)] and v(N)−E [v(S)]. Besides γi[v] and λi[v], we should reserve
a portion of v(T ) for the common good of the economy and society.
3.1 A Real-Time Balanced Budget Rule
As noted above, we purposely divide the net production v(T ) into three
components. The first one is for employment benefits. We compare the coeffi-
cients of v(T ) in Eq.(7) and that of E
[∑
i∈S
(
v(S)−v(S\ i))] in Eq.(6), ignoring
the probability density for the scenario; the employed labor T should retain
t(θ+ρ−1)−nθ
ρ+n−t−1 v(T ) as their employment benefits. The rest,
[
1− t(θ+ρ−1)−nθρ+n−t−1
]
v(T ),
pays to the government as “tax”2. Besides, we assume both λi[v] and γi[v] are
2 In practice, not all unemployment welfare comes from the taxation system. In the United
States, for example, it is funded by a compulsory governmental insurance system, which
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tax-exempt in order to avoid any double taxation. Thus, we define the tax rate
τ as
τ
def= 1− s(θ+ρ−1)−nθ
ρ+n−s−1 , s= 1, · · · ,n−1. (8)
For the time being, the rate relies on the labor market size n and the em-
ployment rate ω = |S|n , but not on the production v(S). In this definition, we
exclude two extreme but unlikely cases at ω= 0 and ω= 1.3 Secondly, we com-
pare the coefficients of v(T ) in Eq.(7) and that of E
[ ∑
i∈N\S
(
v(S∪ i)−v(S))]
in Eq.(6); the unemployed labor N\T should claim t(θ+ρ−1)−n(θ−1)θ+t−1 v(T ) from
the tax revenue τv(T ) as its unemployment welfare. Thirdly, we assume that a
reserved proportion, δv(T ), is not individually and not directly distributed to
the labor force N. As a consequence, the tax rate τ includes both the reserve
ratio δ and the proportion to the unemployment welfare, i.e.,
τ ≡ δ+ s(θ+ρ−1)−n(θ−1)
θ+s−1 . (9)
The reserve δv(T ) is meant to serve the general public’s interests and to
have broad appeal, rather than the individual needs. More specifically, δv(T )
includes, but is not limited to, the payments to the population who are not
in the labor force, to the corporate equity earnings not used for employment
benefits, to the public administration and national defense, to the public wel-
fare, to the tax deficit from the past, to the future development, and so on. By
manages the collection and payment accounts. However, the contribution to and distribution
from the insurance system are de facto of a type of payroll tax. In Australia, unemployment
welfare, as part of social security benefits, is funded through the taxation system.
3 In reality, the two cases have zero probability to occur, even though the probability
model (3) gives a very slight chance.
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admitting the corporate equity earnings to the reserve δv(T ), we have deliber-
ately ignored firm-specific re-distribution processes of the net corporate earn-
ings, and have purposely avoided the associated corporate income taxation.
In practice, government expenditure4 and corporate earnings are two major
components of the reserve δv(T ). When the government has other sources of
tax revenue, a pro rata share of its expenditure will come from δv(T ). Besides,
the government could implement a countercyclical fiscal policy by adjusting
its spending level in δv(T ) such that it counteracts the ratio of the corporate
earnings to the production. Indeed, by Eq.(9), τ automatically reacts posi-
tively to the change of the corporate earning ratio, other things remaining the
same.
Put in another way, the real-time balanced budget rule implied in Eq.(8)
and Eq.(9) forbids any borrowing between different labor market scenarios or
forbids any inter-temporal borrowing. Thus, this sustainable taxation policy
meets the needs of the present market scenario without compromising the abil-
ity of future market scenarios to meet their own needs. In practice, however, it
is challenging, if not impossible, to enforce or enact the balanced budget rule
at the labor market scenario level or on a real-time basis. In the United States,
for example, the employment rate ω changes daily and is recorded monthly
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; as a policy variable, the tax rate τ changes
yearly. Striving for the balanced budget rule to the highest degree, one could
4 including that in all levels of government but excluding all unemployment welfare pay-
ments.
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minimize the variance of the employment rate ω within a yearly time frame.
In a perfect situation, the employment rate closely follows a degenerate prob-
ability distribution and remains almost constant within the year. We discuss
the variance minimization in Section 4. In contrast to the exhaustive distri-
bution of the net production in the national accounts, a household could still
maximize its utility through inter-temporal borrowing, saving, lending, and
consuming.
3.2 Sets of Feasible Solutions
Although the terms “tax rate” and “tax rule” have been used loosely and
interchangeably about τ , we must distinguish between them to have an accu-
rate discussion. As a tax rule or tax policy, τ is a function of (n,ω,δ), subject
to the equality of employment opportunity and the balance of budget as spec-
ified in Eq.(8) and Eq.(9). In contrast, as a tax rate, τ is merely the value of
the function at a specific (n,ω,δ) .
For a given triple of (n,ω,δ), there are three indeterminates (θ,ρ,τ) in the
system of two equations Eq.(8) and Eq.(9). Let Ωn,ω,δ denote the set of all
feasible combinations of (θ,ρ,τ) which satisfy both Eq.(8) and Eq.(9):
Ωn,ω,δ
def=

(θ,ρ,τ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
τ = 1− nω(θ+ρ−1)−nθρ+n−nω−1 ,
τ = δ+ nω(θ+ρ−1)−n(θ−1)θ+nω−1 ,
0≤ τ ≤ 1, θ > 0, ρ > 0.

.
From now on, a “fair tax rate” could mean a solution of τ in Ωn,ω,δ; or it could
be a limit of tax rates which satisfy Eq.(8) and Eq.(9).
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In general, for a reasonable δ, a finite n, and a ω ∈ (0,1), there are infinitely
many solutions in Ωn,ω,δ. In this case, we need one more restriction to solve
(θ,ρ,τ) uniquely. To do so, one could capitalize on the statistical relation
between ω and (θ,ρ): the prior mean and mode of ω are θθ+ρ and
θ−1
θ+ρ−2 ,
respectively (e.g., Johnson et al. 1995, Chapter 21). Alongside this direction,
for example, we could set θθ+ρ (or
θ−1
θ+ρ−2 ) to be the historical average (or
mode, respectively) of ω in the previous year. Alternatively, we could set θθ+ρ
or θ−1θ+ρ−2 to be a target employment rate or the natural employment rate.
However, this type of identification schemes requires additional input (e.g.,
historical average, target employment rate, or natural employment rate).
Furthermore, to derive a unique solution from Ωn,ω,δ or its boundary, we
should base our deviation on observed data only. One concern in the input
(n,ω,δ) is the size of the labor market n. Even though the size n is not random
in our model of equal employment opportunity, it is likely a time-varying latent
variable in that there is no clear cut between entry to and exit from the labor
market; and many depressed unemployed persons may not actively seek new
positions. In practice, n changes daily whereas τ most likely changes yearly.
No matter how it changes and how much latent it is, however, we are confident
that n is a large number in the general economy. Thus, in contrast to Eq.(8)
and Eq.(9), we seek a fair tax rule which is valid for all large n’s but is not
specific to a particular n. As a result, the tax rule we are targeting should not
involve n, and we may write it as τ(ω,δ) : (0,1)× (0,1)→ (0,1).
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To visualize the solution set Ωn,ω,δ, let us write (θ,ρ) in terms of (n,δ,τ,ω)
using Lemma 1 in the Appendix. Figure 1(a-b) plots the feasible solution sets
for n = 10000, δ = .1, and any ω ∈ (0,1). Note that there is a straight line
which dramatically raises both θ and ρ. From Figure 1(c-d), we observe that
both θ and ρ drop sharply on the other side of the straight line. As a matter of
fact, any point on the other side of the straight line does not represent a fair
solution, owing to the positivity requirement of θ and ρ. Actually, the straight
line has a tax rule τ(ω,δ) = 1−ω+ δω. This linear relation between τ and ω
can be seen from Lemma 1: on the one hand, when ∆≡ω+τ−δω−1> 0, both
θ = n
2ω∆1+n∆2+∆3
n∆+∆3 and ρ =
n2(1−ω)∆1+n∆4+∆3
n∆+∆3 increase to +∞ as n→∞,
due to the positivity of ∆1 ≡ δω−ω− τ + 2 > 0; on the other hand, when
∆ < 0, both θ and ρ decrease to −∞ as n→∞. Thus, the singular line is
expressed as ∆= 0, or τ(ω,δ) = 1−ω+ δω. Furthermore, for any fair tax rule
on the side of ∆ > 0, the posterior employment rate p˜n,ω has a degenerated
limit distribution as n→∞. This is claimed in Theorem 2. The next section
answers a related question: which tax rule makes the distribution convergence
fastest. The answer happens to be the solution on the singular line.
Theorem 2 For any fair tax rule τ(ω,δ) ∈ (1−ω+ δω,1), as n→∞, p˜n,ω
converges in distribution to the degenerate probability distribution with mass
at ω.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 1: Solutions of Eq.(8) and Eq.(9) for n= 10000, δ = .1, ω ∈ (0,1).
4 AN ASYMPTOTIC RISK-FREE TAX RATE
In this section, we derive the limit fair tax rule τ(ω,δ) = 1−ω+ δω from
a few different angles. At a minimum, a good tax rule should not discourage
employment incentives and productivity, such as detailed in Theorem 5 and
7. On the other end, we expect a good rule to be robust and optimal under
multiple criteria. We study five criteria in Theorem 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8, any of
which uniquely identifies the solution. They either minimize the employment
market risk or maximize the employment expectation, under a given market
capacity and a budget balance constraint.
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First, we should heavily exploit the observed market behavior. While an
efficient labor market stimulates productivity v(S), a higher employment rate
does not imply higher productivity and vice versa — the production function
v(S) does not necessarily increase with the employment size |S|. Acemoglu
and Shimer (2000) find that a moderate level of unemployment could boost
productivity by improving the quality of jobs. Indeed, it fosters peer pressure
in producing v(S), allows workers to move on from declining firms, and enables
rising companies and the economy as a whole to optimally respond to external
shocks. Therefore, our tax rule would not merely target a higher expectation of
employment rate, but grounds its assumption in the observed market behavior,
and lets the market itself respond with a higher employment rate, to the
maximum extent permitted by the budget rule and the market capacity.
Secondly, from a statistical viewpoint, our tax rule relies on a realization
of p, not on the uncertainty of the realized value. A natural way to factor out
this uncertainty is to study the posterior rate p˜n,ω, where both s and ω are
no longer random. As Theorem 2 indicates, ω is informative and indicative
in revealing the central tendency of the posterior labor market, delineated by
p˜n,ω. Asymptotic dispersion of p˜n,ω and the market’s response to the tax rule
τ(ω,δ) are among other essential ingredients in the complete profile of p˜n,ω.
Thus, we set optimal criteria to minimize dispersion measures or maximize
the expected market response.
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4.1 Zero Asymptotic Posterior Variance
Tax rate stability creates the right environment for a balance of payments,
reduces the uncertainty of the labor market, and creates confidence in technol-
ogy and human capital investment. As a function of ω, τ migrates the risk from
the unemployment rate to the tax rate. With the absence of other exogenous
shocks, indeed, stability in the tax rate is equivalent to that in the unemploy-
ment rate. The same argument is also valid when the exogenous shocks are
orthogonal to that in ω.
When we use the variance of p˜n,ω to measure its instability, Theorem 3
states that the tax rule τ(ω,δ) = 1−ω+ δω minimizes the asymptotic vari-
ance of p˜n,ω. Furthermore, it is also the limit of variance-minimizing tax rules
for finite labor markets. We add the restriction “θ,ρ ≥ 1n” in the finite labor
markets to ensure the positivity of the hyperparameters (θ,ρ).
Theorem 3 As n→∞, the tax rule τ(ω,δ) = 1−ω+ δω minimizes the limit
variance of
√
np˜n,ω, i.e., argmin
τ
lim
n→∞VAR(
√
np˜n,ω) = 1−ω+ δω. Besides,
lim
n→∞argminτ
VAR
(√
np˜n,ω
∣∣ θ,ρ≥ 1n)= 1−ω+δω. Furthermore, both the min-
imum limit variance and the limit minimum variance are zero.
We provide a few comments to help clarify any potential misunderstandings
about the theorem. First, a stable
√
np˜n,ω is achieved at n=∞ where the limit
variance is zero. However, p˜n,ω is still exposed to exogenous shocks, such as
those studied in Pissarides (1992) and Blanchard (2000). Secondly, it is worth
emphasizing that 1−ω+ δω is the limit tax rule as n→∞. For a large but
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finite n, a small positive number could be added to 1−ω+ δω to ensure the
positivity5 of θ and ρ. That small positive number, however, is negligible;
thus, we can practically use the rule τ(ω,δ) = 1−ω+δω without any addition.
Moreover, a higher-order approximation τ = 1−ω+ δω+ ω(1−ω)(1−δ)2n could
be an excellent alternative6 to τ = 1−ω+ δω. Thirdly, with a zero or near
zero variance in the unemployment rate, labor mobility means one layoff and
one new hire should almost coincide to ensure the total employment size |S|
remains nearly constant. It also means that the sizes of employment and labor
market change proportionally so that their ratio remains unchanged. Lastly,
though the posterior distribution is skewed, the tax rule minimizes both the
overall risk and the one-sided risk of
√
np˜n,ω, as stated in Theorem 4. In
particular, a policymaker’s concern is on the downside risk only.
Theorem 4 As n→∞, the tax rule τ(ω,δ) = 1−ω+ δω minimizes both the
limit lower semivariance and the limit upper semivariance of
√
np˜n,ω.
4.2 Consistency and Robustness
The above fair tax rule also captures several striking features of the labor
market. In the first place, it is the policymaker’s best response to the market
to stimulate employment within the framework of Eq.(8) and Eq.(9). In the
second place, we can also derive it by minimizing statistical dispersion mea-
5 See details in the proof of Theorem 3.
6 See the proof of Theorem 3 for details.
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sures other than the posterior variance or semivariance. Meanwhile, it helps
mitigate income inequality.
The rule τ(ω,δ) = 1−ω+δω is an effective taxation strategy to maximally
boost the employment size without breaking the opportunity equality and the
budget balance. For an economic policymaker, one primary concern is the
forward-looking employment profile p˜n,ω. By Theorem 2, the mean of p˜n,ω
converges to ω as n→∞ for any fair rule τ(ω,δ) ∈ (1−ω+ δω,1). When n
is finitely large, they respond adversely to an increasing τ (cf Theorem 5).
Consequently, to maximize the posterior mean, we should minimize the tax
rate τ while still maintaining the conditions τ(ω,δ) ∈ (1−ω+δω,1), θ > 0 and
ρ > 0. Thus, the limit of fair tax rates which maximize the mean of p˜n,ω would
be 1−ω+ δω. As a remark, the condition ω > .5 in Theorem 5 is satisfied in
the general economy.
Theorem 5 For any ω ∈ (.5,1) and a finitely large n, the mean of p˜n,ω reacts
negatively to an increasing tax rate τ ∈ (1−ω+ δω,1). As a consequence,
lim
n→∞argmaxτ
MEAN
(
p˜n,ω
∣∣ θ,ρ≥ 1
n
)
= 1−ω+ δω.
Furthermore, the tax rule also minimizes the mean absolute deviation
(thereafter, MAD) from the mean as n→∞. For a Beta distribution, es-
pecially with large parameters, MAD is a more robust measure of statistical
dispersion than the variance. The MAD around the mean for the posterior
p˜n,ω is (e.g., Gupta and Nadarajah 2004, page 37):
E [|p˜n,ω−E(p˜n,ω)|] = 2(θ+s)
θ+s(ρ+n−s)ρ+n−s
β(θ+s,ρ+n−s)(θ+ρ+n)θ+ρ+n . (10)
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In the next theorem, we identify the same tax rule by minimizing the asymp-
totic MAD.
Theorem 6 As n→∞, the tax rule τ(ω,δ) = 1−ω+δω minimizes the MAD
of np˜n,ω around the mean, i.e. lim
n→∞argminτ
E
[
n |p˜n,ω−E(p˜n,ω)|
∣∣∣∣ θ,ρ≥ 1n]=
1−ω+δω. Besides, argmin
τ
lim
n→∞E
[
n |p˜n,ω−E(p˜n,ω)|
∣∣∣∣ θ,ρ≥ 1n]= 1−ω+δω.
4.3 Equality of Outcome with Symmetric Production
To see the relation between productivity and the tax rate, we introduce
a partial ordering in the labor market. For any i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, we say i
uniformly outperforms j in v if
– v(T ∪ i)−v(T )≥ v(T ∪ j)−v(T ) for any T ⊆ N\ i\ j; and
– v(T )−v(T \ i)≥ v(T )−v(T \ j) for any T ⊆ N with i, j ∈ T .
With these two inequality conditions, i has higher marginal productivity than
j in all comparable employment contingencies − either both employed or both
unemployed. As productivity is highly valued in Eq.(4) and Eq.(5), j should
receive fewer employment benefits and less unemployment welfare than i does.
This is formally claimed in Theorem 7. Besides, the theorem does not require
the Beta-Binomial distribution, as long as i and j alone have the same chance
of being employed; other players in the labor market may have unequal em-
ployment opportunities. The theorem is valid for all fair tax rules, including
the special one τ(ω,δ) = 1−ω+ δω.
A DICHOTOMOUS ANALYSIS OF UNEMPLOYMENT WELFARE 25
Theorem 7 If i ∈ N uniformly outperforms j ∈ N in v and they have equal
employment opportunity, then γi[v]≥ γj [v] and λi[v]≥ λj [v].
We say i, j ∈N are symmetric in the production function v if they uniformly
outperform each other. By Theorem 7, λi[v] = λj [v] and γi[v] = γj [v] if i and j
are symmetric and they have equal employment opportunity. In other words,
they should receive the same amount of unemployment welfare if both are
unemployed; they should also receive the same amount of employment benefits
if both are employed.
Without any further analysis of or any prior knowledge about the produc-
tion function, symmetry among the unemployed (or the employed) could be
a reasonable a priori assumption to distribute the unemployment welfare (or
employment benefits, respectively). For example, the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function is symmetric among all employed persons in the labor market.
Besides, if we assume symmetry among the employed labor and also assume
symmetry among the unemployed labor, then the tax rule τ(ω,δ) = 1−ω+δω
eliminates the income inequality, when the income is either employment ben-
efits or unemployment welfare. Theorem 8 affirms this equality of outcome,
but an employed individual and an unemployed one may not be symmetric in
v. Furthermore, the theorem does not restrict the size of n and the specific
probability distribution for the equal employment opportunity. In the k-out-
of-n redundant system mentioned in Section 1, accordingly, the n components
(either working or standby) are equally important if they have equal qual-
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ity. Section 6 offers a few alternative probability distributions for the equal
employment opportunity.
Theorem 8 Assume equal employment opportunity in N. If all employed indi-
viduals are symmetric in v and all unemployed individuals are also symmetric
in v, then τ(ω,δ) = 1−ω+ δω if and only if an unemployed person’s unem-
ployment welfare equals an employee’s employment benefits.
4.4 Labor Cost
We could use the symmetry to calibrate the labor cost, which is excluded
from v(S). For example, let the labor cost for i ∈ S be the minimum wage
requirement from all j ∈ N\S, who either are symmetric with i or uniformly
outperforms i in v. That is, some j from N\S can do i’s work without compro-
mising the production v. The minimum wage is called reservation wage, below
which j is unwilling to work. At this minimum market replacement cost, S
can switch i with someone else from N\S without sacrificing its net profit.
In fact, j does not need to be symmetric with or outperform i as long as the
probability of v(S∪ j \ i)≥ v(S∪ i\ j) is significantly large and the person has
a willingness to accept (e.g., Horowitz and McConnell 2003). The probability
of such S could be difficult for job interviewers to approximate and estimate.
At the other end, in order to avoid creating an undue disincentive to work,
j’s unemployment welfare must be less than the reservation wage plus em-
ployment benefit. Moreover, to ensure every one of N is in the labor market,
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the welfare is necessary to bind to the incentive-compatibility constraint. This
incentive requirement places a lower bound for the labor cost.
5 OTHER APPLICATIONS
In an abstract sense, the above account is a fair-division solution for the
following game-theoretic setting: there are a large number of players; the play-
ers are randomly divided into two groups; the payoff comes from one group.
A wide range of applications falls into this type of games. In this section, we
analyze three applications other than labor markets to show how to use the
formula derived in the last three sections.
5.1 Voting Power
In a voting game (e.g., Shapley 1962), v : 2N → {0,1} is a monotonically
increasing set function. Let S denote the random subset of voters who vote for
the proposal. The proposal passes when v(S) = 1; otherwise, it blocks when
v(S) = 0. However, v should not mean “production” or alike.
No matter the outcome, Hu (2006) describes γi[v] as i’s probability of
turning a blocked result to a passed one, and λi[v] the probability of turning
a passed result to being blocked. Thus, the sum of λi[v] and γi[v] quantifies
i’s power in the game.
The ratio δ plays a role in some circumstances. Let us consider, for example,
10% of the voters approve just a proposal before a referendum voting on the
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proposal, and assume the number of other voters’ support ballots follows a
Beta-Binomial distribution.
Many voting games are symmetric. In these cases, the equality of outcome
becomes an egalitarian allocation of power.
5.2 Health Insurance
Health insurance has two types of policyholders: some are ill and use the
insurance to cover their medical expenses; others are healthy and do not use
the insurance. Let S denote the random set of ill policyholders, v(S) be the
total medical expenses with copays deducted, and δ˜v(S) be the surcharge paid
to the insurance company. Let δ =−δ˜. Then the total expenses except for the
copays, (1− δ)v(S), are billed to all insurance policyholders.
If τ = 1−ω+δω and v is symmetric among the two types of policyholders,
respectively, then by the equality of outcome, the cost to buy the insurance pol-
icy would be (1−δ)E[v(S)]n per policyholder. We take expectation on
(1−δ)v(S)
n
because the policyholders pay it upfront. On the contrary, the unemployment
welfare and employment benefits payments come after the production.
In this example, patients pay the predetermined copays. In the labor mar-
ket studied before, the labor costs are exempt from the distribution of the net
production; they, however, have an indirect effect on τ through the corporate
earning ratio and δ. In the next example, we use the equality of outcome to
derive the same type of payments as copays and labor cost.
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5.3 Highway Toll
The I-66 highway inside the Capital Beltway of the Washington metropoli-
tan area has enforced a dynamic toll rule during rush hours: a carpool driver
pays no toll, but a solo driver pays a dynamic toll fee, say ξ(n,ω). Here n is
the number of cars in the segment of the highway, and ω is the percentage of
solo drivers in the traffic.
Let g(n) be the average carpool driver’s cost in the traffic when the traffic
volume is n cars. It is likely a nonlinear increasing function of n. An excellent
choice of g(n) is the expected driving time in hours multiplied by the average
hourly pay rate, plus expenses on gas and vehicle depreciation. Also, let S de-
note the random set of solo drivers. Then, v(S) =ng(n)−n(1−ω)g (n(1−ω))−
nωξ(n,ω) is the total cost of over-traffic generated by the solo drivers, with
toll fees deducted.
The production function v is symmetric among all solo drivers and also
symmetric among all carpool drivers. By the equality of outcome, each driver
shares the same cost v(S)n . As a carpool driver pays no toll, his or her shared
cost should exactly offset the extra cost caused by the solo drivers, which is
g(n)−g (n(1−ω)). Finally, equation v(S)n = g(n)−g (n(1−ω)) implies ξ(n,ω) =
g (n(1−ω)) .
In this example, an administration surcharge δ may apply; the carpooled
passengers are free-riders, but their costs are exempt from v(S).
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a fair-division solution is proposed to allocate the unem-
ployment welfare in an economy, where the heterogeneous-agent production
function is almost unknown. We interpret “fairness” as equal employment
opportunity and model it by a Beta-Binomial probability distribution. Our
“sustainability” is meant to be free of debt and free of surplus in the taxa-
tion budget. To justify the value of the unemployed labor, we capitalize on
the D-value concept in Hu (2018). The D-value specifies how much of the net
production to be retained with the employed labor, and what portion to be
distributed to the unemployed. Finally, we postulate that the labor market
is static and identify a sustainable tax policy by minimizing the asymptotic
variance of the posterior employment rate. The policy can also be uniquely de-
termined by minimizing the asymptotic posterior mean of the unemployment
rate, or minimizing the downside risk of the posterior employment rate, or
minimizing the posterior mean absolute deviation. Surprisingly, the tax rule
is not only simple enough for practical use but also motivates the unemployed
to seek employment and the employed to improve productivity.
One could extend this framework in several ways. One way is to re-specify
the probability distribution of equal employment opportunity, for example, by
any of the following re-specifications. First, we can replace the two-parameter
Beta distribution with a four-parameter one or a Beta rectangular distribution.
Secondly, we can let θ and ρ be some functions of other unknown parameters.
Thirdly, we could substitute the Beta-Binomial distribution with a Dirichlet-
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Multinomial distribution or a Beta-Geometric distribution. Fourthly, we could
randomize p without involving (θ,ρ), by generating two independent three-
parameter Gamma random variables X and Y . Then, the ratio X/(X+Y ) is
a Beta random variable. In any of the four cases, however, we need additional
identification restrictions to figure out a τ(ω,δ) precisely.
From other angles, we could apply other identification schemes or other
objective functions to find a unique fair tax rule. From a statistical viewpoint,
one could try the maximum likelihood estimation using the twelve months’
data prior to determining the policy tax rate, or minimize the ex-ante risk of
ω, or apply the statistical methods mentioned in Section 3.2. From an economic
viewpoint, one could minimize the Gini coefficient of the Beta distribution of
p˜n,ω. From a strategic game-theoretical viewpoint, one could seek a bargaining
solution from the feasible solution set Ωn,ω,δ, which may be particularly useful
when n is small. Finally, a policymaker could treat the reserve ratio δ as
endogenous, for example, letting it be an increasing function of ω. He or she
could also place a heavier weight on the marginal gain than on the marginal
loss, in order to stimulate employment.
The simple static model, however, ignores several important aspects of
a real labor market. First, it does not capture the dynamic features of the
income inequality, nor its rational response to the tax rule. Secondly, while
preventing the fungibility of borrowing funds from the future reduces the risk
that a government administration piles up its national debt, it impairs that
administration’s ability (especially, monetary policy) to intervene in the econ-
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omy. The government, however, can still moderately stimulate the economy
during a recession by adjusting the reserve ratio δ. Thirdly, the postulation of
labor market efficiency does neglect the recent development of the incomplete-
market theory (e.g., Magill and Quinzii 1996). Fourthly, a multi-criteria ob-
jective function may be a viable alternative to the minimum-variance one,
especially when there is a high unemployment rate 1−ω or a large δ. Lastly, a
single tax rule τ(ω,δ) could have overly simplified the complexity of the tax-
ation system, which is also affected by other determinants. These are just a
few challenges our framework introduces, which require further development.
In summary, the fair and sustainable tax policy studied here has a solid
theoretical underpinning, together with simplicity in practical use, consistency
with productivity and employment incentives, and robustness to similar ob-
jectives. When applying this framework to a real fair-division problem, one
should also consider the benefits of alternative probability distributions for
equal opportunity, alternative objective functions, alternative restrictions, and
dynamic thinking.
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APPENDIX
Our focus in this paper is to study the relationship between the fair tax
rate τ and the employment rate ω when the labor market size n is large.
To analyze the limit behavior of τ and ω for a large n, we only need the
relevant asymptotic approximations. We say two functions f(n) = O (g(n)) if
limsup
n→∞
∣∣∣f(n)g(n) ∣∣∣<∞; and we say f(n)≈ g(n) if limn→∞ f(n)g(n) = 1. For simplicity, let
us denote the following shorthands:
∆ ≡ ω+ τ − δω−1,
∆1 ≡ δω−ω− τ + 2≡ 1−∆,
∆2 ≡ δωτ −2δω−ωτ2 + 2ωτ + τ −1,
∆3 ≡ (1− τ)(δ− τ) = δ− τ − δτ + τ2,
∆4 ≡ −δωτ + δω+ δτ −2δ+ωτ2−2ωτ +ω− τ2 + 3τ −1,
∆5 ≡ −δω+ δτ −2δ+ω− τ2 + 4τ −2≡∆2 +∆4,
∆6 ≡ −ωδ+ωτ + τ −1≡∆2 +ω∆3,
∆7 ≡ −δ−ωτ + 2τ +ω−1≡∆4 + (1−ω)∆3,
∆8 ≡ −δω− δ+ω+ 3τ −2≡∆3 +∆5,
∆9 ≡ −2δω− δ+ 2ω+ 4τ −3≡∆+∆8.
The following lemma, to be used in other proofs, re-writes Eq.(8) and
Eq.(9).
Lemma 1 In terms of (n,δ,τ,ω), we can solve (θ,ρ) from Eq.(8) and Eq.(9)
as 
θ = n
2ω∆1+n∆2+∆3
n∆+∆3 ,
ρ= n
2(1−ω)∆1+n∆4+∆3
n∆+∆3 .
(A.1)
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A1. Proof of Theorem 1
In this proof, we use the following relation about Beta functions:

β(x−1,y+ 1) = yx−1β(x,y), x > 1, y > 0;
β(x+ 1,y−1) = xy−1β(x,y), x > 0, y > 1.
First, the expected aggregate marginal gain and loss are:
E
[∑
i∈S
(
v(S)−v(S\ i))] = ∑
T⊆N
P(S= T )
∑
i∈T
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)]
=
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:i∈T
P(S= T )
[
v(T )−v(T \ i)]
=
∑
i∈N
γi[v],
E
[ ∑
i∈N\S
(
v(S∪ i)−v(S))] = ∑
T⊆N
P(S= T )
∑
i∈N\T
[
v(T ∪ i)−v(T )]
=
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:i 6∈T
P(S= T )
[
v(T ∪ i)−v(T )]
=
∑
i∈N
λi[v].
Next, by Eq.(3)−(5), we re-write the expected marginal gain and loss as:
γi[v] =
∑
T⊆N:T3i
β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) [v(T )−v(T \ i)]
Z=T\i=
∑
T⊆N:T3i
β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )−
∑
Z⊆N\i
β(θ+|Z|+1,ρ+n−|Z|−1)
β(θ,ρ) v(Z),
λi[v] =
∑
Z⊆N\i
β(θ+|Z|,ρ+n−|Z|)
β(θ,ρ) [v(Z ∪ i)−v(Z)]
T=Z∪i=
∑
T⊆N:T3i
β(θ+t−1,ρ+n−t+1)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )−
∑
Z⊆N\i
β(θ+|Z|,ρ+n−|Z|)
β(θ,ρ) v(Z).
(A.2)
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By Eq.(A.2), the aggregate value of the employed labor
∑
i∈N
γi[v] is
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:T3i
β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )−
∑
i∈N
∑
Z⊆N\i
β(θ+|Z|+1,ρ+n−|Z|−1)
β(θ,ρ) v(Z)
T=Z=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
∑
i∈T
β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )−
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N
∑
i∈N\T
β(θ+t+1,ρ+n−t−1)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
tβ(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )−
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N
(n−t)β(θ+t+1,ρ+n−t−1)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )
= nβ(θ+n,ρ)β(θ,ρ) v(N)− nβ(θ+1,ρ+n−1)β(θ,ρ) v(∅)
+
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,T 6=N
tβ(θ+t,ρ+n−t)−(n−t)β(θ+t+1,ρ+n−t−1)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )
= nβ(θ+n,ρ)β(θ,ρ) v(N)− nθρ+n−1 β(θ,ρ+n)β(θ,ρ) v(∅)
+
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N,T 6=∅
[
t− (n−t)(θ+t)ρ+n−t−1
]
β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )
= nβ(θ+n,ρ)β(θ,ρ) v(N) +
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N
t(θ+ρ−1)−nθ
ρ+n−t−1
β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T ).
Also by Eq.(A.2), the aggregate value of the unemployed labor
∑
i∈N
λi[v] is
∑
i∈N
∑
T⊆N:T3i
β(θ+t−1,ρ+n−t+1)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )−
∑
i∈N
∑
Z⊆N\i
β(θ+|Z|,ρ+n−|Z|)
β(θ,ρ) v(Z)
T=Z=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
∑
i∈T
β(θ+t−1,ρ+n−t+1)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )−
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N
∑
i∈N\T
β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
tβ(θ+t−1,ρ+n−t+1)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )−
∑
T⊆N:T 6=N
(n−t)β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )
= nβ(θ+n−1,ρ+1)β(θ,ρ) v(N)− nβ(θ,ρ+n)β(θ,ρ) v(∅)
+
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,T 6=N
tβ(θ+t−1,ρ+n−t+1)−(n−t)β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )
= nρθ+n−1
β(θ+n,ρ)
β(θ,ρ) v(N)− nβ(θ,ρ+n)β(θ,ρ) v(∅)
+
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅,T 6=N
[
t(ρ+n−t)
θ+t−1 − (n− t)
]
β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )
=
∑
T⊆N:T 6=∅
t(θ+ρ−1)−n(θ−1)
θ+t−1
β(θ+t,ρ+n−t)
β(θ,ρ) v(T )− nβ(θ,ρ+n)β(θ,ρ) v(∅).
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A2. Proof of Lemma 1
We can re-write Eq.(8) and Eq.(9) as a linear system of unknowns (θ,ρ):

(1− τ)(ρ+n−s−1) = s(θ+ρ−1)−nθ,
(τ − δ)(θ+s−1) = s(θ+ρ−1)−n(θ−1).
As a consequence, the symbolic solution of (θ,ρ) is unique.
Let us assume Eq.(A.1) and verify that it satisfies both Eq.(8) and Eq.(9)
by the following identities, some of which are used in other proofs:
θ+s = n
2ω∆1+n∆2+∆3
n∆+∆3 +
nω(n∆+∆3)
n∆+∆3 =
n2ω+n∆6+∆3
n∆+∆3 ,
θ+s−1 = n2ω+n∆6+∆3n∆+∆3 −
n∆+∆3
n∆+∆3 =
n2ω+n(∆6−∆)
n∆+∆3 =
n2ω+nω(τ−1)
n∆+∆3 ,
θ+ρ = n
2ω∆1+n∆2+∆3
n∆+∆3 +
n2(1−ω)∆1+n∆4+∆3
n∆+∆3 =
n2∆1+n∆5+2∆3
n∆+∆3 ,
θ+ρ−1 = n2∆1+n∆5+2∆3n∆+∆3 −
n∆+∆3
n∆+∆3 =
n2∆1+n(δτ−2δ−τ2+3τ−1)+∆3
n∆+∆3 ,
θ+ρ+n = n
2∆1+n∆5+2∆3
n∆+∆3 +
n(n∆+∆3)
n∆+∆3 =
n2+n∆8+2∆3
n∆+∆3 ,
θ+ρ+n+ 1 = n
2+n∆8+2∆3
n∆+∆3 +
n∆+∆3
n∆+∆3 =
n2+n∆9+3∆3
n∆+∆3 ,
θ+ρ+n−1 = n2+n∆8+2∆3n∆+∆3 −
n∆+∆3
n∆+∆3 =
n2+n(∆8−∆)+∆3
n∆+∆3 ,
θ+ρ+n−2 = n2+n∆8+2∆3n∆+∆3 −
2(n∆+∆3)
n∆+∆3 =
n2+n(∆8−2∆)
n∆+∆3 ,
ρ+n−s = n2(1−ω)∆1+n∆4+∆3n∆+∆3 +
n(1−ω)(n∆+∆3)
n∆+∆3 =
n2(1−ω)+n∆7+∆3
n∆+∆3 ,
ρ+n−s−1 = n2(1−ω)+n∆7+∆3n∆+∆3 −
n∆+∆3
n∆+∆3 =
n2(1−ω)+n(1−ω)(τ−δ)
n∆+∆3 .
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Thus,
s(θ+ρ−1)−nθ = nω[n2∆1+n(δτ−2δ−τ2+3τ−1)+∆3]n∆+∆3
−n(n2ω∆1+n∆2+∆3)n∆+∆3
= n
2[ω(δτ−2δ−τ2+3τ−1)−∆2]+n(ω−1)∆3
n∆+∆3
= n
2(1−ω)(1−τ)+n(ω−1)∆3
n∆+∆3 ,
s(θ+ρ−1)−n(θ−1) = [s(θ+ρ−1)−nθ] +n
= n
2(1−ω)(1−τ)+n(ω−1)∆3
n∆+∆3 +
n(n∆+∆3)
n∆+∆3
= n
2ω(τ−δ)+nω∆3
n∆+∆3 .
Therefore,
s(θ+ρ−1)−nθ
ρ+n−s−1 =
n2(1−ω)(1−τ)+n(ω−1)∆3
n2(1−ω)+n(1−ω)(τ−δ) = 1− τ,
s(θ+ρ−1)−n(θ−1)
θ+s−1 =
n2ω(τ−δ)+nω∆3
n2ω+nω(τ−1) = τ − δ,
which are equivalent to Eq.(8) and Eq.(9), respectively.
A3. Proof of Theorem 2
For any integer z ≥ 0, by the proof of Lemma 1,
θ+s+z
θ+ρ+n+z =
n2ω+n∆6+∆3
n∆+∆3
+ z(n∆+∆3)n∆+∆3
n2+n∆8+2∆3
n∆+∆3
+ z(n∆+∆3)n∆+∆3
= n
2ω+n(∆6+z∆)+(1+z)∆3
n2+n(∆8+z∆)+(2+z)∆3
→ ω, as n→∞.
As a function of η, the characteristic function of p˜n,ω (e.g., Johnson et al.
1995, Chapter 21) is
E
[
eiηp˜n,ω
]
= 1 +
∞∑
k=1
(iη)k
k!
k−1∏
z=0
θ+s+z
θ+ρ+n+z
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where i is the unit imaginary number, i.e., i2 =−1. We let n→∞,
lim
n→∞E[e
iηp˜n,ω ] = 1 +
∞∑
k=1
(iη)k
k! limn→∞
k−1∏
z=0
θ+s+z
θ+ρ+n+z
= 1 +
∞∑
k=1
(iηω)k
k!
= exp(iηω).
Therefore, as n→∞, p˜n,ω converges in distribution to the degenerate distri-
bution with mass at ω, which has the characteristic function exp(iηω).
A4. Proof of Theorem 3
As p˜n,ω has a Beta distribution with parameters (θ+ s,ρ+ n− s) (see
Section 2.1), its variance is (θ+s)(ρ+n−s)(θ+ρ+n)2(θ+ρ+n+1) (e.g., Gupta and Nadarajah
2004, page 35). By the proof of Lemma 1, the variance of
√
np˜n,ω is
n
n2ω+n∆6+∆3
n∆+∆3
n2(1−ω)+n∆7+∆3
n∆+∆3(
n2+n∆8+2∆3
n∆+∆3
)2
n2+n∆9+3∆3
n∆+∆3
= n(n∆+∆3)(n
2ω+n∆6+∆3)[n2(1−ω)+n∆7+∆3]
(n2+n∆8+2∆3)2(n2+n∆9+3∆3)
=
(
∆+∆3n
)[
ω
(
1+∆6nω+
∆3
n2ω
)][
(1−ω)
(
1+ ∆7
n(1−ω)+
∆3
n2(1−ω)
)]
(
1+∆8n +
2∆3
n2
)2(
1+∆9n +
3∆3
n2
)
= ω(1−ω)
(
∆+ ∆3n
)[
1 + ∆6nω +
∆7
n(1−ω) − 2∆8n − ∆9n +O
( 1
n2
)]
= ω(1−ω)∆+ ω(1−ω)n
[
∆3 +∆(∆6ω +
∆7
1−ω −2∆8−∆9)
]
+O
( 1
n2
)
→ ω(1−ω)(ω+ τ − δω−1), as n→∞.
(A.3)
To minimize lim
n→∞VAR(
√
np˜n,ω) = ω(1−ω)∆ while lim
n→∞VAR(
√
np˜n,ω) ≥ 0,
we have to set ∆= 0. Thus, argmin
τ
lim
n→∞VAR(
√
np˜n,ω) = 1−ω+ δω.
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However, when applying τ = 1−ω+δω to a labor market with finite n, we
have ∆= 0, ∆1 = 1 and ∆3 =−ω(1−ω)(1− δ)2. And Lemma 1 reduces to
θ = n
2ω+n∆2−ω(1−ω)(1−δ)2
−ω(1−ω)(1−δ)2 ,
ρ = n
2(1−ω)+n∆4−ω(1−ω)(1−δ)2
−ω(1−ω)(1−δ)2 ,
which converge to −∞ as n→∞. In theory, therefore, for a large but finite n,
we need to choose τ to be 1−ω+ δω plus a small positive number to ensure
that θ > 0 and ρ > 0. To estimate the small positive number, let us first try
the higher-order approximation of
τ = 1−ω+ δω+ c
n
,
for some constant c > 0. Then
∆ = cn ,
∆3 =
[
ω(1− δ)− cn
][−(1−ω)(1− δ)− cn]
= −ω(1−ω)(1− δ)2 +O ( 1n) .
(A.4)
By the next to the last step in (A.3),
VAR
(√
np˜n,ω
∣∣∣ τ = 1−ω+ δω+ c
n
)
= ω(1−ω)c−ω
2(1−ω)2(1− δ)2
n
+O
(
1
n2
)
.
To minimize the above variance, we let c = ω(1−ω)(1− δ)2. Thus, τ = 1−
ω+δω+ ω(1−ω)(1−δ)
2
n is a higher-order approximation for 1−ω+δω. Further
high-order approximations, if necessary, could be found similarly.
When τ = 1−ω+ δω+ cn , let us use Eq.(A.4) to calculate
n∆+∆3 = c+
[
ω(1− δ)− cn
][−(1−ω)(1− δ)− cn]
= (1−2ω)(1−δ)cn +
c2
n2
(A.5)
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which is negative when ω > .5 and n≥
∣∣∣ω(1−ω)(1−δ)1−2ω ∣∣∣. As the numerators of θ
and ρ in Lemma 1 are both positive for a large n, θ and ρ are negative when
n is large and ω > .5.
Let us make another try at τ = 1−ω+ δω+ 2cn . Similar to Eq.(A.5),
n∆+∆3 = 2c+
[
ω(1− δ)− 2cn
][−(1−ω)(1− δ)− 2cn ]
= c+ 2(1−2ω)(1−δ)cn +
4c2
n2 .
In this case, both θ and ρ are larger than 1n when n is large. Note from the
last step of Eq.(A.3) that VAR(
√
np˜n,ω) is an increasing function of τ when n
is large; thus, the small positive number to be added to 1−ω+ δω is between
c
n and
2c
n . In practice, however, as the number is too small for a large n, there
is no necessity to exactly calculate it and add it to 1−ω+ δω.
Let τ˜n = argmin
τ
VAR
(√
np˜n,ω
∣∣ θ,ρ≥ 1n). We add the restriction θ,ρ ≥ 1n
to ensure the existence of τ˜n. As VAR(
√
np˜n,ω) is an increasing function of τ
when n is large, τ˜n is unique and less than 1−ω+δω+ 2cn when n is large. By
Eq.(A.3),
VAR(
√
np˜n,ω
∣∣∣ τ = τ˜n) = ω(1−ω)(ω+ τ˜n− δω−1) +O( 1
n
)
.
Finally, we use the relation
0≤VAR
(√
np˜n,ω
∣∣∣ τ = τ˜n)≤VAR(√np˜n,ω ∣∣∣ τ = 1−ω+ δω+ 2c
n
)
to get
0≤ ω(1−ω)(ω+ τ˜n− δω−1) +O
(
1
n
)
≤O
(
1
n
)
.
Letting n→∞ in the above inequality, we get ω(1−ω)(ω+ τ˜n−δω−1) =O( 1n ),
i.e., lim
n→∞argminτ
VAR
(√
np˜n,ω
∣∣ θ,ρ≥ 1n)= 1−ω+ δω.
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A5. Proof of Theorem 4
In this proof, we constantly apply the identities in the proof of Lemma 1.
Let µn = θ+sθ+ρ+n be the mean of p˜n,ω, and let σ2n be the variance of p˜n,ω. The
lower semivariance of p˜n,ω is calculated as
σ2n− =
∫ µn
0
(x−µn)2x
θ+s−1(1−x)ρ+n−s−1
β(θ+s,ρ+n−s) dx.
We apply Chebychev’s inequality in terms of the lower semivariance (e.g.,
Berck and Hihn 1982) to get
P(p˜n,ω ≤ µn−anσn−)≤ 1
a2n
, ∀ an > 0.
By the proof of Theorem 3, p˜n,ω has the variance σ2n =
ω(1−ω)∆
n +O(
1
n2 ). We
let an =
√
ω(1−ω)∆
n
σn− , then
P
(
p˜n,ω ≤ µn−
√
ω(1−ω)∆
n
)
≤ nσ
2
n−
ω(1−ω)∆. (A.6)
Let κn = θ+s−1θ+ρ+n−2 and εn be the mode and median of p˜n,ω, respectively.
The mode κn maximizes the density function x
θ+s−1(1−x)ρ+n−s−1
β(θ+s,ρ+n−s) ,0 < x < 1.
As the median lies between the mean and mode, we have
|µn−εn| ≤ |µn−κn|=
∣∣∣ θ+sθ+ρ+n − θ+s−1θ+ρ+n−2 ∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣ n+ρ−θ−2s(θ+ρ+n)(θ+ρ+n−2) ∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣ θ+s(θ+ρ+n)(θ+ρ+n−2) ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ n+ρ−s(θ+ρ+n)(θ+ρ+n−2) ∣∣∣
= O( 1n ).
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In the following lower-bound estimation of Eq.(A.6), we use Gamma function,
denoted by Γ (·), and its Stirling’s approximation Γ (z+ 1)≈√2piz
(
z
exp(1)
)z
.
P
(
p˜n,ω ≤ µn−
√
ω(1−ω)∆
n
)
= P(p˜n,ω ≤ εn)−
εn∫
µn−
√
ω(1−ω)∆
n
xθ+s−1(1−x)ρ+n−s−1
β(θ+s,ρ+n−s) dx
≥ 12 −
∣∣∣∣εn−(µn−√ω(1−ω)∆n )∣∣∣∣ κnθ+s−1(1−κn)ρ+n−s−1β(θ+s,ρ+n−s)
= 12 −
∣∣∣∣√ω(1−ω)∆n +O( 1n )∣∣∣∣ ( θ+s−1θ+ρ+n−2)θ+s−1(1− θ+s−1θ+ρ+n−2)ρ+n−s−1Γ (θ+s)Γ (ρ+n−s)
Γ (θ+ρ+n)
= 12 −
∣∣∣∣√ω(1−ω)∆n +O( 1n )∣∣∣∣ (θ+s−1)θ+s−1Γ (θ+s) (ρ+n−s−1)ρ+n−s−1Γ (ρ+n−s)(θ+ρ+n−2)θ+ρ+n−2
(θ+ρ+n−1)Γ (θ+ρ+n−1)
≈ 12 −
√
ω(1−ω)∆
n
exp(θ+s−1)√
2pi(θ+s−1)
exp(ρ+n−s−1)√
2pi(ρ+n−s−1)
exp(θ+ρ+n−2)
(θ+ρ+n−1)
√
2pi(θ+ρ+n−2)
= 12 −
√
ω(1−ω)∆
n
(θ+ρ+n−1)
√
θ+ρ+n−2√
2pi(θ+s−1)(ρ+n−s−1)
≈ 12 −
√
ω(1−ω)∆
n
n
∆
√
n
∆√
2pi nω∆
n(1−ω)
∆
= 12 − 1√2pi .
Finally, we re-write Eq.(A.6) as
(
1
2 −
1√
2pi
)
ω(1−ω)∆+O
(
1√
n
)
≤ nσ2n− ≤ nσ2n = ω(1−ω)∆+O
(
1
n
)
.
Letting n→∞, we get
(
1
2 −
1√
2pi
)
ω(1−ω)∆≤ liminf
n→∞ nσ
2
n− ≤ limsup
n→∞
nσ2n− ≤ ω(1−ω)∆.
Therefore, ∆= 0 minimizes the limit of lower semivariance of
√
np˜n,ω.
We can apply similar arguments to the upper semivariance of
√
np˜n,ω.
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A6. Proof of Theorem 5
Note that ∆6−ω∆8 = (1− τ)(2ω−1)+ω2(δ−1). By the proof of Lemma
1,
E[p˜n,ω] = θ+sθ+ρ+n =
n2ω+n∆6+∆3
n2+n∆8+2∆3
= ω+ n(∆6−ω∆8)+(1−2ω)∆3
n2+n∆8+2∆3
= ω+ (1−τ)(2ω−1)+ω
2(δ−1)
n +O(
1
n2 ).
In the above approximation, the mean reacts negatively with an increasing
τ , when n is finitely large and ω > .5. To maximize the mean, we thus minimize
τ ∈ (1−ω+ δω) such that θ > 0 and ρ > 0. Particularly, using the proof of
Theorem 3, we can make it smaller than 1− ω+ δω+ 2cn when n is large
enough, i.e.
1−ω+ δω < argmax
τ
MEAN
(
p˜n,ω
∣∣ θ,ρ≥ 1
n
)
≤ 1−ω+ δω+ 2c
n
.
Finally, let n→∞ in the above inequalities to get
lim
n→∞argmaxτ
MEAN
(
p˜n,ω
∣∣ θ,ρ≥ 1
n
)
= 1−ω+ δω.
for any ω ∈ (.5,1).
A7. Proof of Theorem 6
When n is large, θ,ρ≥ 1n implies τ(ω,δ) ∈ (1−ω+ δω,1). By the proof of
Lemma 1, both θ+ s→∞ and ρ+n− s→∞ as n→∞. Applying Stirling’s
formula, Johnson et al. (1995, page 219) derive the following approximation
for the ratio of the variance and the squared MAD around the mean:
lim
θ+s→∞,ρ+n−s→∞
(E [|p˜n,ω−E(p˜n,ω)|])2
VAR(p˜n,ω)
= 2
pi
.
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Thus, minimizing the MAD around the mean is equivalent to minimizing the
variance of p˜n,ω when n is large. By Theorem 3, we have proved Theorem 6.
A8. Proof of Theorem 7
For any i, j ∈N and i 6= j, if i uniformly outperforms j and they have equal
employment opportunity, then
γj [v] =
∑
T⊆N:j∈T
P(S= T )[v(T )−v(T \ j)]
=
∑
T⊆N:j∈T,i∈T
P(S= T )[v(T )−v(T \ j)]
+
∑
T⊆N:j∈T,i 6∈T
P(S= T )[v(T )−v(T \ j)]
≤ ∑
T⊆N:j∈T,i∈T
P(S= T )[v(T )−v(T \ i)]
+
∑
T⊆N:j∈T,i 6∈T
P(S= T )[v(T )−v(T \ j)]
Z=T\j=
∑
T⊆N:j∈T,i∈T
P(S= T )[v(T )−v(T \ i)]
+
∑
Z⊆N:j 6∈Z,i6∈Z
P(S= Z ∪ j)[v(Z ∪ j)−v(Z)]
≤ ∑
T⊆N:j∈T,i∈T
P(S= T )[v(T )−v(T \ i)]
+
∑
Z⊆N:j 6∈Z,i6∈Z
P(S= Z ∪ i)[v(Z ∪ i)−v(Z)]
T=Z∪i=
∑
T⊆N:j∈T,i∈T
P(S= T )[v(T )−v(T \ i)]
+
∑
T⊆N:j 6∈T,i∈T
P(S= T )[v(T )−v(T \ i)]
=
∑
T⊆N:i∈T
P(S= T )[v(T )−v(T \ i)]
= γi[v].
Neither the Beta-Binomial distribution nor Eq.(3) is required in the proof.
Also, the equality of employment opportunity is not required for other players
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in N, except that P(S=Z∪ i) = P(S=Z∪j) for any Z ⊆N\ i\j. This identity
implies that i and j have equal chance to be hired by Z, when both are
unemployed.
Similar arguments can be used to prove λj [v]≤ λi[v]. In this case, we use
the identity P(S= Z \ i) = P(S= Z \ j) for any Z ⊆ N such that i, j ∈ Z. This
identity implies both i and j have equal opportunity to be laid off from Z,
when both are employed in Z.
A9. Proof of Theorem 8
We distribute v(S) to N: (1−τ)v(S) to S and (τ−δ)v(S) to N\S. When the
employed individuals are symmetric in v, Theorem 7 claims that each employed
person receives (1−τ)v(S)|S| as his or her employment benefits. Similarly, any
unemployed person receives (τ−δ)v(S)n−|S| as his or her unemployment welfare.
Finally,
(1− τ)v(S)
|S| =
(τ − δ)v(S)
n−|S|
is equivalent to
(1− τ)
ω
= (τ − δ)1−ω ,
which itself is equivalent to
τ = 1−ω+ δω.
